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Abstract. In ISNN’04, a novel symmetric cipher was proposed, by com-
bining a chaotic signal and a clipped neural network (CNN) for en-
cryption. The present paper analyzes the security of this chaotic cipher
against chosen-plaintext attacks, and points out that this cipher can be
broken by a chosen-plaintext attack. Experimental analyses are given to
support the feasibility of the proposed attack.
1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, the study of using chaotic systems to design new ciphers has
become intensive [1]. In particular, the idea of combining chaos and neural net-
works has been developed [2], [3], [4], [5] and has been adopted for image and
video encryption [6], [7]. In our recent work [8], it has been shown that the
chaotic ciphers designed in [2], [3], [4], [6], [7] are not sufficiently secure from a
cryptographical point of view.
This paper focuses on the security of a clipped-neural-network-based chaotic
cipher proposed in ISNN’04 [5]. This chaotic cipher employs a chaotic pseudo-
random signal and the output of a 8-cell clipped neural network to mask the
plaintext, along with modulus additions and XOR operations. Also, the evolu-
tion of the neural network is controlled by the chaotic signal. With such a com-
plicated combination, it was hoped that the chaotic cipher can resist chosen-
plaintext attacks. Unfortunately, our analysis shows that it is still not secure
against chosen-plaintext attacks. By choosing only two plaintexts, an attacker
can derive an equivalent key to break the cipher. This paper reports our analyses
and simulation results.
⋆ This paper has been published in Advances in Neural Networks C ISNN 2005: Second
International Symposium on Neural Networks, Chongqing, China, May 30 - June 1,
2005, Proceedings, Part II (ISNN 2005), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
3497, pp. 630-636.
⋆⋆ The corresponding author, personal web site: http://www.hooklee.com.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief introduc-
tion to the chaotic cipher under study. The proposed chosen-plaintext attack is
described in detail in Sec. 3, with some experimental results. The last section
concludes the paper.
2 The CNN-Based Chaotic Cipher
First, the CNN employed in the chaotic cipher is introduced. The neural network
contains 8 neural cells, denoted by S0, · · · , S7 ∈ {1,−1}, and each cell is con-
nected with other cells via eight synaptic weights wij ∈ {1, 0,−1}, among which
only three are non-zeros. The synaptic weights between two connected cells are
identical: ∀ i, j = 0 ∼ 7, wij = wji. The neural network evolves according to the
following rule: ∀ i = 0 ∼ 7,
f(Si) = sign
(
S˜i
)
=
{
1, S˜i > 0 ,
−1, S˜i < 0 ,
(1)
where S˜i =
∑7
j=0 wijSj . Note that S˜i 6= 0 holds at all times.
Now, let us see how the chaotic cipher works with the above CNN. With-
out loss of generality, assume that f = {f(i)}N−1i=0 is the plaintext signal, where
f(i) denotes the i-th plain-byte and N is the plaintext size in byte. Accordingly,
denote the ciphertext by f ′ = {f ′(i)}N−1i=0 , where f
′(i) is a double-precision
floating-point number corresponding to the plain-byte f(i). The encryption pro-
cedure can be briefly depicted as follows1.
– The secret key includes the initial states of the 8 neural cells in the CNN,
S0(0), · · · , S7(0), the initial condition x(0), and the control parameter r of
the following chaotic tent map:
T (x) =
{
rx, 0 < x ≤ 0.5 ,
r(1 − x), 0.5 < x < 1 ,
(2)
where r should be very close to 2 to ensure the chaoticity of the tent map.
– The initial procedure: 1) in double-precision floating-point arithmetic, run
the tent map from x(0) for 128 times before the encryption starts; 2) run
the CNN for 128/8 = 16 times (under the control of the tent map, as dis-
cussed below in the last step of the encryption procedure); 3) set x(0) and
S0(0), · · · , S7(0) to be the new states of the tent map and the CNN.
– The encryption procedure: for the i-th plain-byte f(i), perform the following
steps to get the ciphertext f ′(i):
• evolve the CNN for one step to get its new states: S0(i), · · · , S7(i);
• in double-precision floating-point arithmetic, run the chaotic tent map
for 8 times to get 8 chaotic states: x(8i + 0), · · · , x(8i+ 7);
1 Note that some original notations used in [5] have been changed in order to provide
a better description.
• generate 8 bits by extracting the 4-th bits of the 8 chaotic states: b(8i+
0), · · · , b(8i+ 7), and then ∀ j = 0 ∼ 7, set Ej = 2 · b(8i+ j)− 1;
• encrypt f(i) as follows2:
f ′(i) =
((
f(i)⊕B(i)
256
+ x(8i + 7)
)
mod 1
)
, (3)
where B(i) =
∑7
j=0
(
Sj(i)+1
2
)
· 27−j ;
• ∀ i = 0 ∼ 7, if Si 6= Ei, update all the three non-zero weights of the
i-th neural cell and the three mirror weights as follows: wij = −wij ,
wji = −wji.
– The decryption procedure is similar to the above one with the following de-
cryption formula:
f(i) = (256 · ((f ′(i)− x(8i+ 7)) mod 1))⊕B(i) . (4)
3 The Chosen-Plaintext Attack
In chosen-plaintext attacks, it is assumed that the attacker can intentionally
choose a number of plaintexts to try to break the secret key or its equivalent
[9]. Although it was claimed that the chaotic cipher under study can resist this
kind of attacks [5, Sec. 4], our cryptanalysis shows that such a claim is not true.
By choosing two plaintexts, f1 and f2, satisfying ∀ i = 0 ∼ N − 1, f1(i) = f2(i),
one can derive two masking sequences as equivalent keys for decryption.
Before introducing the chosen-plaintext attack, three lemmas are given, which
are useful in the following discussions.
Lemma 1. ∀ a, b, c ∈ R, c 6= 0 and n ∈ Z+, if a = (b mod c), one has a · n =
((b · n) mod (c · n)).
Proof. From a = (b mod c), one knows that ∃ k ∈ Z, b = c ·k+a and 0 ≤ a < c.
Thus, ∀ n ∈ Z+, b · n = c · n · k + a · n and 0 ≤ a · n < c · n, which immediately
leads to a · n = ((b · n) mod (c · n)) and completes the proof of this lemma. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. ∀ a, b, c, n ∈ R and 0 ≤ a, b < n, if c = ((a − b) mod n), one has
a− b ∈ {c, c− n}.
Proof. This lemma can be proved under two conditions. i) When a ≥ b, it is
obvious that ((a − b) mod n) = a − b = c. ii) When a < b, ((a − b) mod n) =
((n + a − b) mod n). Since −n < a − b < 0, one has 0 < n + a − b < n, which
means that ((a− b) mod n) = n+ a− b = c. That is, a− b = c− n. Combining
the two conditions, this lemma is thus proved. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Assume that a, b are both 8-bit integers. If a = b ⊕ 128, then a ≡
(b+ 128) (mod 256).
2 In [5], x(8i+ 7) was mistaken as x(8).
Proof. This lemma can be proved under two conditions. i) When 0 ≤ a < 128:
b = a ⊕ 128 = a + 128, so a ≡ (b + 128) (mod 256). ii) When 128 ≤ a ≤ 255:
b = a⊕ 128 = a− 128, so a ≡ (b− 128) ≡ (b+ 128) (mod 256). ⊓⊔
From Lemma 1, one can rewrite the encryption formula Eq. (3) as follows:
256 · f ′(i) = (((f(i)⊕B(i)) + 256 · x(8i + 7)) mod 256) . (5)
Given two plain-bytes f1(i) 6= f2(i) and the corresponding cipher-blocks f
′
1(i), f
′
2(i),
one has 256·(f ′1(i)−f
′
2(i)) ≡ ((f1(i)⊕B(i))− (f2(i)⊕B(i))) (mod 256). With-
out loss of generality, assume that f ′1(i) > f
′
2(i) and that ∆f1,2 = 256 · (f
′
1(i)−
f ′2(i)). It is true that 0 < ∆f1,2 < 256. Thus, one has
∆f1,2 = (((f1(i)⊕B(i))− (f2(i)⊕B(i))) mod 256) . (6)
Because f1(i) ⊕ B(i) and f2(i) ⊕ B(i) are 8-bit integers and ∆f1,2 6= 0, from
Lemma 2, one of the following facts is true:
1. (f1(i)⊕B(i))− (f2(i)⊕B(i)) = ∆f1,2 ∈ {1, · · · , 255} ; (7a)
2. (f2(i)⊕B(i))− (f1(i)⊕B(i)) =
(
256−∆f1,2
)
∈ {1, · · · , 255} . (7b)
For the above two equations, when f1(i) = f2(i) is satisfied, two possible values
of B(i) can be uniquely derived according to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that a, b, c, x are all 8-bit integers, and c > 0. If a =
b¯, then the equation (a ⊕ x) − (b ⊕ x) = c has an unique solution x = a ⊕
(1, c7, · · · , c1)2, where c = (c7, · · · , c0)2 =
∑7
i=0 ci · 2
i.
Proof. Since a = b¯, one has b⊕ x = a⊕ x. Thus, by substituting y = a⊕ x and
y¯ = a⊕ x = b ⊕ x into (a ⊕ x) − (b ⊕ x) = c, one can get y − y¯ = c, which is
equivalent to y = y¯ + c. Let y =
∑7
i=0 yi · 2
i, and consider the following three
conditions, respectively.
1) When i = 0, from y0 ≡ (y¯0+c0) (mod 2), one can immediately get c0 = 1.
Note the following two facts: i) when y0 = 0, y¯0+c0 = 2, a carry bit is generated
for the next bit, so y1 ≡ (y¯1 + c1 + 1) (mod 2) and c1 = 0; ii) when y0 = 1,
y0 + c0 = 1, no carry bit is generated, so y1 ≡ (y¯1 + c1) (mod 2) and c1 = 1.
Apparently, it is always true that y0 = c1. Also, a carry bit is generated if c1 = 0
is observed.
2) When i = 1, if there exists a carry bit, set c′1 = c1 +1 ∈ {1, 2}; otherwise,
set c′1 = c1 ∈ {0, 1}. From y1 ≡ (y¯1 + c
′
1) (mod 2), one can immediately get
c′1 = 1. Then, using the same method shown in the first condition, one has
y1 = c2 and knows whether or not a carry bit is generated for i = 2. Repeat the
above procedure for i = 2 ∼ 6, one can uniquely determine that yi = ci+1.
3) When i = 7, it is always true that the carry bit does not occur, so c′7 = 1,
and y7 ≡ 1.
Combining the above three conditions, one can get y = (1, c7, · · · , c1)2, which
results in x = a⊕ (1, c7, · · · , c1)2. ⊓⊔
Assume that the two values of B(i) derived from Eqs. (7a) and (7b) are B1(i)
and B2(i), respectively. The following corollary shows that the two values have
a deterministic relation: B2(i) = B1(i)⊕ 128.
Corollary 1. Assume that a, b, c, x are all 8-bit integers, a = b¯ and c > 0. Given
two equations, (a⊕ x)− (b⊕ x) = c and (b⊕ x′)− (a⊕ x′) = c′, if c′ = 256− c,
then x′ = x⊕ 128.
Proof. Since c+ c¯ = 255, one has c′ = 256− c = c¯+ 1. Let c =
∑7
i=0 ci · 2
i, and
observe the first condition of the proof of Theorem 1. One can see that c0 = 1,
so c′0 = c¯0 + 1 = 1. Since there is no carry bit, one can deduce that ∀ i = 1 ∼ 7,
c′i = c¯i. Applying Theorem 1 for (a ⊕ x) − (b ⊕ x) = c, one can uniquely get
x = a⊕(1, c7, · · · , c1)2. Then, applying Theorem 1 for (b⊕x
′)−(a⊕x′) = c′, one
has x′ = b⊕ (1, c′7, · · · , c
′
1)2 = a¯⊕ (1, c¯7, · · · , c¯1)2 = (a7, a¯6 ⊕ c¯7, · · · , a¯0 ⊕ c¯1)2 =
(a7, a6 ⊕ c7, · · · , a0 ⊕ c1)2 = a⊕ (1, c7, · · · , c1)2 ⊕ (1, 0, · · · , 0)2 = x⊕ 128. Thus,
this corollary is proved. ⊓⊔
For any one of the two candidate values of B(i), one can further get an
equivalent chaotic state xˆ(8i+ 7) from B(i), f(i) and f ′(i) as follows:
xˆ(8i+ 7) = 256 · f ′(i)− (f(i)⊕B(i)) ≡ 256 · x(8i+ 7) (mod 256) . (8)
With B(i) and xˆ(8i+ 7), the encryption formula Eq. (3) becomes
f ′(i) =
((f(i)⊕B(i)) + xˆ(8i+ 7)) mod 256
256
, (9)
and the decryption formula Eq. (4) becomes
f(i) = ((256 · f ′(i)− xˆ(8i+ 7)) mod 256)⊕B(i) . (10)
Assume that xˆ1(8i+ 7) and xˆ2(8i+ 7) are calculated by Eq. (8), from B1(i)
and B2(i), respectively. Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (B1(i), xˆ1(8i+ 7)) and (B2(i), xˆ2(8i+ 7)) are equivalent for the
above encryption procedure Eq. (9), though only one corresponds to the correct
value generated from the secret key. That is,
((f(i)⊕B1(i)) + xˆ1(8i+ 7)) ≡ ((f(i)⊕B2(i)) + xˆ2(8i+ 7)) (mod 256) .
Proof. From B1(i) = B2(i)⊕ 128, one has f(i)⊕ B1(i) = (f(i)⊕ B2(i) ⊕ 128).
Then, following Lemma 3, it is true that (f(i) ⊕ B1(i)) ≡ ((f(i) ⊕ B2(i)) +
128) (mod 256). As a result, xˆ1(8i + 7) = (256 · f
′(i) − (f(i) ⊕ B1(i))) ≡
(256 · f ′(i)− ((f(i)⊕B2(i))− 128)) (mod 256) ≡ (xˆ2(8i+7)+ 128) (mod 256),
which immediately leads to the following fact: ((f(i)⊕B1(i)) + xˆ1(8i+ 7)) ≡
((f(i)⊕B2(i)) + xˆ2(8i+ 7)) (mod 256). Thus, this proposition is proved. ⊓⊔
Considering the symmetry of the encryption and decryption procedures, the
above proposition immediately leads to a conclusion that (B1(i), xˆ1(8i+ 7)) and
(B2(i), xˆ2(8i+ 7)) are also equivalent for the decryption procedure Eq. (10).
From the above analyses, with two chosen plaintexts f1 and f2 = f¯1, one
can get the following two sequences: {B1(i), xˆ1(8i+ 7)}
N−1
i=0 and {B2(i), xˆ2(8i+
7)}N−1i=0 . Given a ciphertext f
′ = {f ′(i)}N−1i=0 , ∀ i = 0 ∼ N−1, one can use either
(B1(i), xˆ1(8i + 7)) or (B2(i), xˆ2(8i + 7)) as an equivalent of the secret key to
decrypt the i-th plain-byte f(i), following Eq. (10). This means that the chaotic
cipher under study is not sufficiently secure against the chosen-plaintext attack.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed attack, some experiments have
been performed for image encryption, with secret key r = 1.99, x(0) = 0.41
and [S0(0), · · · , S7(0)] = [1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1]. One plain-image “Lenna” of
size 256 × 256 is chosen as f1 and another plain-image is manually generated
as follows: f2 = f¯1. The two plain-images and their cipher-images are shown
in Fig. 1. With the two chosen plain-images, two sequences, {B1(i), xˆ1(8i +
7)}256×256−1i=0 and {B2(i), xˆ2(8i+7)}
256×256−1
i=0 , are generated by using the above-
mentioned algorithm. The first ten elements of the two sequences are given in
Table 1. ∀ i = 0 ∼ (256×256−1), either (B1(i), xˆ1(8i+7)) or (B2(i), xˆ2(8i+7))
can be used to recover the plain-byte f(i). As a result, the whole plain-image
(“Peppers” in this test) can be recovered as shown in Fig. 1f.
Table 1. The first ten elements of {B1(i), xˆ1(8i + 7)}
256×256−1
i=0 and
{B2(i), xˆ2(8i+ 7)}
256×256−1
i=0
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B1(i) 146 231 54 202 59 243 166 173 233 82
B2(i) 18 103 182 74 187 115 38 45 105 210
xˆ1(8i+ 7) 242.40 38.63 242.62 222.09 81.03 214.73 240.91 203.59 138.20 9.33
xˆ2(8i+ 7) 114.40 166.63 114.62 94.09 209.03 86.73 112.91 75.59 10.20 137.33
4 Conclusion
In this paper, the security of a chaotic cipher based on clipped neural network
has been analyzed in detail. It is found that the scheme can be effectively broken
with only two chosen plain-images. Both theoretical and experimental analyses
have been given to support the proposed attack. Therefore, this scheme is not
suggested for applications that requires a high level of security.
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